the dialogues themselves and on the "indirect transmission" of Plato´s philosophy, which testifies for an "esoteric" teaching in the Academy (which had of course nothing to do with any sort of "reading between the lines").
Hence the confusion with regard to the term "esoteric".
Staehler´s misunderstanding of the term "esoteric" is, on the one hand, so simple, and on the other hand, so widespread among those who do not take the trouble to read anything by Krämer or Gaiser, that it would not make sense to single out her article for a detailed examination of her numerous misconceptions. What prompts me to write a few remarks on that article is the presence of a number of statements about the Tübingen School that are presented as objective information, but are incorrect -i.e. not a matter of dispute or interpretation, but simply false. Here are some of them.
(1) "Unlike the Tübingen School authors, Strauss is not exclusively a Plato scholar" (Staehler 74). As if Hans Krämer and Konrad Gaiser have not worked on any other themes than those in the narrow field of Platonic scholarship? Krämer has developped his own philosophy of ethics (Integrative Ethik, 1992) and of hermeneutics (Kritik der Hermeneutik, 2007) , moreover he has worked on modern anthropology and aesthetics (Anthropologie der Kunst, 1994) and on post-Platonic ancient philosophy (Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik, 1964 Paulo, v.8, n.2. p. 160-166, 2014 . DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981 past 10 years (Konrad Gaiser, Gesammelte Schriften, 2004, 29-41 (She abstains, as usual, from giving a reference.) According to the Tübingen interpretation, the Phaedrus nowhere dismisses writing; it just shows its limits as a tool of philosophical communication.
(5) Several times Staehler attempts to sum up the hermeneutical position of the Tübingen School as an attempt to ascribe to Plato an intention "to hide something", or "to conceal certain messages" (71, 77, 78, 79) . She believes this tendency to be common to the The Tübingen School, on the other side, is not part of the Schleiermacherian mainstream. Its representatives do not believe in Plato´s "intention to hide something". Plato does not "hide"
his theory of principles, he keeps it out of his writings, refers it to a different context, namely to the context of orality. The semantic difference between "to hide something" and "to keep something out of something" or "to refer something to a different context" should be clear:
when an author wants to hide something, he will not point to the content he is about to hide (and Schleiermacher understood the allegedly Platonic "indirect communication" precisely in this way). Plato´s procedure is different: he makes Socrates claim that he does have an own view on the ti estin of the Good, and at the same time he lets him stop short of communicating this view (Republic 506 e). It would be utterly misleading to speak here of Plato´s "hiding a certain message". Instead, we should acknowledge that Plato refers in this and in all similar passages the philosophically most important question to another context: to the context where the author would, as the "father of the logos" (patēr tou logou), orally (legōn autos) expound his "things of greater value" (his timiōtera). See Phaedrus 275 e, 278 cd.
I stop here, although there are many more erroneous statements in Staehler´s article.
Particularly annoying is her attempt to construe a "traditional Tübingen School" that would be opposed to my position, and her constant allegation that her opponents give an uncomplete exegesis. It is she who says nothing on Phaedrus 276 b -278 e, nothing on the Seventh Letter (except for a footnote "explaining" why she shuns an interpretation), and finally nothing on the Aristotelean reports about Plato´s theory of principles, which are for her nothing but Although one of Krämer´s books, one of Gaiser´s and one of mine are listed in Staehler´s bibliography, the overall impression left by her portrait of the Tübingen School is that her knowledge of this ´School´ is derived from other sources than these three books.
Books that contain close interpretations of the dialogues should not be denigrated as "turning away from the dialogues".
(ii) Response to Szlezák
Tanya Staehler University of Sussex
Szlezák accuses me of using the term "esoteric" as a mere homonym. In fact, the approach of my article is open to such an outcome since it is the purpose of my article to trace similarities and differences between the Straussians and the Tübingen School. Yet despite the fact that there are quite a number of crucial differences between the two approaches, the outcome is nonetheless that the usage is not that of a homonym. More precisely, I introduce "esoteric" by way of Szlezák's own definition ("conveying knowledge in a way which is strictly orientated toward the needs of the addressee" (PSP, 406; cited on p. 69)), and it seems to me, based on the examination conducted in my article, that this definition certainly works perfectly for the Straussians as well.
Yet even if the outcome had been that the two approaches are referred to as esoteric but turn out to hold an entirely different meaning of this term, it would not have been detrimental to my article. In general, it was the purpose of my essay to begin from the traditional understanding or perception of these approaches and investigate them. This common perception was also the basis for my claim that the Tübingen School representatives are mostly Plato scholars, unlike Strauss who holds a much more diverse and problematic
reputation. Yet it is true that I should have formulated more carefully at that moment, differentiating between "being" and "being perceived as".
In general, it seems to me that in relation to most of Szlezák's points of criticism, it is important to bear in mind that my article represents and examines (a) a common conception which is submitted to a (b) comparative perspective. While there might be problems with comparative studies in general and in particular, it is quite important to consider the comparative aspect of my article since it helps clarify some of the statements Szlezák picks out as problematic. For example, when I speak of "turning away from the dialogues", I do not mean a complete turning away, by any means, but turning away more so than the Straussians, and also more so than Szlezák himself whom I single out as a much more successful reader of the Platonic dialogues than his predecessors. In short, it seems to me that even though Krämer and Gaiser certainly do not turn away from the dialogues entirely, they attend to them mostly as texts which they relate to the ideas of the unwritten doctrine. In this sense, the unwritten doctrine emerges as the framework of reading and the standard for the dialogues as texts whereas attending to the dialogues as dialogues allows attending much more fully to their rich, lively, multi-faceted nature in which, for example, the ambiguity of writing can be The role of Schleiermacher in relation to these two approaches is indeed a complex one; but I have pointed out quite explicitly that Strauss is closer to Schleiermacher (p. 77).
hermeneutical one, but it seems to me that assessing the two main esoteric approaches from a certain distance rather than belonging to one of them proves useful, and would in fact be the only possible starting point for such a comparison.
A detailed reading is also provided by Szlezák himself, and I am sorry to have "annoyed" Szlezák by singling out his work as far more successful than his predecessors, in terms of clarity, accessibility, explicit methodology, and close attention given to the dialogues (p. 69 etc.). His rejection of the separation created by me between his work and those of Gaiser and Krämer might at least serve to confirm a certain unity among the Tübingen thinkers. His perception that I see the representatives of the Tübingen School as my "opponents" is misplaced. In particular, I do not argue "against" Szlezák, as he puts it, but actually for him, ascribing to him a "return to the dialogues" (p. 73). But I understand that this is not what Szlezák desires me to do, and I will refrain from such attempts in the future. The misunderstandings debated here could, to my mind, at least serve as a general reminder that an interpretation that focuses on author's intentions can easily be flawed, especially if it ascribes intentions of arguing "against" somebody when there are none.
